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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COM~iISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS V. WILLIAlVIS and 
.JO ANN H. 'VILLIAJ\'IS, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
Case No. 
11388 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PREFACE 
Appellants seek a re-hearing and a reconsideration 
of the opinion handed down in this matter by this Court 
on April 4, 1969. It is submitted that the opinion con-
tains several errors of law, that it adds to considerable 
confusion which already exists in the field of eminent 
domain law in the State of Utah, and that the rule 
announced in the decision is unworkable in practice. 
1 
It is further submitted that the opinion places Utah 
law in a very narrow minority of jurisdictions restrict-
ing recovery for severance damages, and, specifically, 
the ruling places Utah practically alone among the 
jurisdictions denying consideration to the element of 
noise in its effect upon the value of real property -
both in "severance" and "consequential" damage situ-
ations. 
Although the writer of this Petition is fully aware 
that the Court rarely re-considers these matters, it is 
still felt that he would be totally remiss in his duty in 
not seeking a re-hearing since the Court's opinion did 
not squarely decide the issue presented to it, it improp-
erly ruled out consideration of noise in all eminent 
domain cases-even though the plaintiff did not contend 
that noise was never recoverable, and the legal and fac- • 
tual difficulties created by the decision will further 
haunt the orderly trial of eminent domain cases in the 
future. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTINCTION BET\VEEN SEVER-
ANCE AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
SET FORTH IN THE OPINION IS BOTH 
LEGALLY INCORRECT AND CONFUSING. 
Basic to any understanding and computation of 
damages in a condemnation case is the proper categori-
2 
zation of the two principal types of damages to prop-
erties not taken in a condemnation suit. As pointed 
out in the opinion in this matter, Section 78-34-10, 
U.C.A. 1953, contains two specific sub-sections covering 
damages to remaining properties. It is submitted by 
appellants-and was so contended in their Brief in this 
matter-that the two sub-sections clearly delineate the 
difference between "severance" and "consequential" 
damages. Any different definition to these two types of 
damages will inevitably create nothing but mounting 
confusion in the field of eminent domain law. 
The crux of the distinction in the Court's opinion 
is contained in the following sentence: 
"All damages not caused by the taking or the 
severing of the land or the manner of the con-
struction of the improvement are consequential 
and not within the protection of the constitutional 
provision unless they are such as would be action-
able at common law or would affect the land 
physically." 
It is submitted that the foregoing definition of 
"consequential" damages is incorrect and vague, unsup-
ported by any decision or authority. This writer again 
! reiterates and contends that if the damages result from 
situations involving an underlying taking of property, 
then the resulting damages must be termed "severance"; 
otherwise, if there is not an underlying taking of prop-
erty, then the resulting damages are "consequential". 
This distinction is made mandatory by the two sub-
sections of our statute. As Nichols points out (Sec. 
3 
6.4432), broadly speaking, " ... all damages must o!. 
necessity be consequential since all damage is the con-' 
sequence of an injurious act." But that work goes on 
to point out the difference between taking and no taking 
cases. In 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 14-1 at 
page 473 it is stated: 
"A distinction must be drawn between conse-
question damages to a remainder area where part 
of a tract is physically appropriated and conse-
questial damages to a tract no part of which is: 
physically appropriated. In the latter case the\ 
damage must be peculiar to such land and not I 
such as is suffered in common with the general 
public." 
In defining the word "consequential" damages 2 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 6.4432 states the 
meaning to be-
"The term is generally used with reference to 
damage to property no part of which is appro· 
priated." 
In its opinion in this matter this Court has taken I 
the definition of "consequential" damages and super· 
imposed it over into the area of "severance" damages. 
Even if the ultimate decision of this Court was intended 
to be that noise cannot be considered in any eminent 
domain case, it is still clearly erroneous to create con· 
fusion in the field of eminent domain law by classifying 
noise as a "consequential" damage in a case where there 
exists an underlying actual taking of property within 
the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 78-34-10, U.C.A 
4 
1953. Rather, as this writer has contended before this 
Court on two different occasions, in a taking case the 
proper classification of "severance" damages should 
remain, but the ruling should be that the particular type 
of damage is simply non-cornpensable. 
Believing that issues of this type can often be better 
presented in a pictorial or diagram form, there is in-
serted on the flyleaf of this brief a sheet showing the 
different types of "severance" and "consequential" dam-
ages and various Utah decisions supporting the com-
pensable types of damages under each category. The 
Utah decisions can generally be properly classified, 
although some need to be "stretched" a bit to fit. A few 
cases, not included in the outline are, in the writer's 
opinion, clearly wrong. It can be seen that the writer 
has clearly delineated "severance" from "consequential" 
damages, and within each classification there are-as 
this writer is contending in this Petition-definite com-
pensable and non-compensable items. It is submitted 
that the accompanying chart, which has been prepared 
by this writer as a general condensation of many years 
of careful study and devotion of the major portion. of 
his practice to eminent domain matters, is the first 
realistic attempt in this state to properly categorize 
some of the pertinent cases and the type of damages 
involved in different situations which have arisen. 
If there has been a partial taking the entire pro-
ceeding as to damages to remaining properties is gov-
verned by sub-section (2) of Section 78-34-10, as -
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"severance" damages. On the other hand, if there is no 
underlying taking, then the proceedings and the type 
of damages are recoverable under sub-section ( 3) ol 
the same statutory section-" consequential" damages. 
In short, the two types of dam.ages are mutually ea1clu. 
sive and can never be found together in any litigatio11 
involving the same remaining piece of property I 
To illustrate the distinction between "severance" 
and "consequential" damages, we can utilize two previ· 
ously decided cases of this court. In the case of Spring. 
ville Banking Company v. Burton ( 1960), 10 U. 2d 
100, 349 P. 2d 157, and the case of Fairclough vs. Salt 
Lake County ( 1960), 10 U. 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105, we 
actually had two cases involving "consequential" dam· 
ages for the simple reason that there was no basic under· 
lying taking such as would bring the State Road Com· 
mission into Court. However, if in both cases there had 
in fact been an actual taking of a portion of the prop· 
erty owner's lands, thereby classifying the damages 
in both instances as "severance" damages, we would 
have a situation producing different results. In the 
Springville Banking case, since the nature of the dam· 
ages was caused by the creation of traffic islands or 
dividers in the street, such damage had there actually 
been a taking, would have been non-compensable-and 
that portion of the evidence would not go to the jury 
at all. This would be so because the action taken was 
a function of the police power in regulating the flow 
of traffic. 
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On the other hand, if we assume that there had been 
an actual taking of a portion of the properties in the 
F1airclough case, the matter would have been entirely 
different since the taking and the construction of the 
project was tied to a substantial change of highway 
grade affecting the property's right of access. The 
nature of the damage under such facts would also be 
"severance" but the evidence of loss of value to the 
remaining properties would be clearly admissible and 
recoverable under our Utah cases and those of prac-
tically every other jurisdiction known to the writer, since 
this type of damage is compensable. 
Until our Utah decisions clearly and properly 
delineate the distinctions between "severance" and "con-
sequential" damages, and the correlative concepts of 
"compensable" and "non-compensable" damages, the 
confusion among our cases will grow greater and 
greater. Until this decision and the recent case of State 
of Utah by and through its Road Commission v. Stanger 
(No. 11028), ____ Utah 2d ____ , 442 P. 2d 941, it was 
possible to properly categorize the different Utah deci-
sions as being "severance" or "consequential" situations. 
Now, however, the concept of "consequential" damages 
has by this decision been carried across the line into the 
area of what have customarily been known as "sever-
ance" damages under sub-section ( 2) of Section 78-
34-10. * * * * 
In its decision this Court made another statement 
which has done nothing to clarify the law in this state: 
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I 
" . the statute above set out gives a land. I 
owner whose land is taken in part the damage~ 
which will accrue to the land not taken by reason 
of its severance and by reason of the improve-
ment in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
In this case it is neither the damage occasionea 
by the construction of the improvement nor the I 
severance of the land which caused these defend· 
ants to feel aggrieved, but rather it is the failure I 
to recover the damages occasioned by the noise 
of the traffic . . . " 
Actually, Judge Norseth did in fact rule in his, 
findings that the noise was "due to the widening of the 
prevoiusly existing highway" and the " ... closer prox-
imity ... " of the travelled portion the new highway 
to the residence of the defendants; therefore, the pre· 
viously quoted portion of the Court's opinion would 
seem to imply that only "construction" damages result· 
ing during the time when the highway was being built 
would be recoverable. Such an approach would, ol 
course, exclude damages resulting from the subsequent 
"use" of the highway facility. 
If damages incurred during "construction" only 
can be considered, then we again find Utah in a very 
narrow position among the various state court decisions. I 
As a practical matter, most courts severely limit the 
recovery for damages caused during the course of actual 
constructoin since the bulk of such damages are not a 
necessary and ordinary incident of the nature of thr 
project. Such damages are usually the type which in· 
volve negligence on the part of a contractor. In short. 
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the area of recovery, under a construction which would 
limit the recoveries to damages actually caused by and 
during construction, is practically meaningless in its 
effect toward furnishing a property owner with just 
compensation. 
The only logical and sensible approach to the pro-
vision of our statute allowing for recovery due to " ... 
the construction of the improvement in the manner pro-
posed ... " is to give the phrase a reasonable interpre-
tation. Thus, the various courts have held that the "use" 
' to be made of the property being acquired is a proper 
element to be considered on the matter of "severance" 
damages to the remaining properties. Referring to 
Appellant's Brief filed in this matter the case of City of 
Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69 N.W. 2d 909, 
dearly sets forth ( p. 14) the distinction between "sever-
ance" and "consequential" damage, and it also pointed 
out that there should be considered both the "taking 
and use" ... "to which the property taken will be devoted 
by the taker." Further, in the case of Department of 
Highways vs. Elizabethtown A1nuse1nents, Inc., 367 
S.W. 2d 449 (Kentucky), the statement concerning 
use was again mentioned: 
"In any situation the use to which the con-
demned property will be put necessarily will have 
some bearing on the existence and extent of dam-
age to the remaining land of the condemnee. A 
common example would be a reduction in value 
of residential property resulting from the high-
way's being brought in close proximity to the 
dwelling." 
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From 26 American Jurisprudence 2d, Eminent 
Domain, Sec. 160, page 830, the rule is further enunci. 
ated: 
''It is not necessary that damages shall be 
caused by trespass or an actual physical invasion 
of the real estate, but if the construction and 
operation of the improvement are the cause of 
the damage, although consequential, the party 
may recover." · 
Contrary to the interpretation given the Oregon 
Short Line Railroad case in this Court's opinion in this 
matter, the same section from American Jurisprudence 
states that-
"Any definite physical injury to land or an • 
inVMion of it cognizable to the senses, depreciat- 1 
ing its value, is a damage in the constitutional 
sense, regardless of whether it is such an injury 
as a neighboring owner might inflict without 
liability at common law." 
The rule stated by this Court's opinion requires 
that any damage arising from the use of the acquired 
property in a partial taking case must be actionable 
at common law or affect the land physically. A similar 
rule can be found in numerous cases and in the writings 
of authorities on eminent domain; however, the rule 
has never been applied to partial taking cases. The 
requirement that the damage be actionable at common 
law or directly affect the land physically applies only 
to no-taking cases and has never been applied to partial· 
taking cases. The error in applying this rule to partial 
taking cases is pointed out in 2 Nichols on Eminent 
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Domain, Sec. 6.441 (2) where the rule is discussed 
in its application to no-taking cases and not in its appli-
cation to partial taking cases. Nichols points out that 
damages actionable at common law are those actionable 
if done by an individual. Since an individual could not 
effect a partial taking, the rule has no application to 
partial taking cases. Any encroachment upon the land 
analogous to a complete partial taking was and is obvi-
ously compensable. The rule's application came in the 
no-taking cases where the injury originated or sprang 
from neighboring property. The loss of lateral support 
is an example of an injury actionable at common law. 
This Court should not create an anachronism by apply-
ing this rule to cases where it has historically not been 
applied and where it is totally unworkable. 
Even in its application to no-taking cases, the rule's 
reference to damages actionable at common law has 
been criticized. In 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 
6.441 ( 2) , the reference was said to " ... neither clarify 
I 
the situation nor give the clause a broad enough mean-
ing ... " Also, in the same section the test to determine 
whether an injury is actionable at common law was 
said to be " . . . in 1nost cases . . . " 
C.J Se./ e S ~ 
A consideration of Subsection ( 4) of Section 78-
·H-10, concerning benefits, will point out the inconsis-
tency in this Court's position. That subsection provides 
that benefits " . . . by the construction of the improve-
ments proposed by the plaintiff . . . " can be set-off 
against damages to the remaining tract. It will be noted 
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that Subsection ( 4) refers to "construction" as do Sub-
sections ( 2) and ( 3), and likewise contains no direct 
reference to "use". 
Nevertheless, this Court and all courts allowing 
a set-off for benefits have allowed benefits arising from 
the use of the proposed improvement. In fact, it is ditfi. 
cult to conceive of a benefit which does not arise from 
the u-se of the proposed improvement. That benefits 
do arise from the use of the proposed improvement is 
attested to by 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 
8.62, page 58: 
"In those jurisdictions where set-off is per· 
mitted, consideration may only be given to those 
benefits which are to accrue from the projected 
u-se on behalf of which the immediate condemna· 
tion is instituted. Benefits .accruing from other 
improvements cannot be considered." (Emphasis 
added). 
A listing of some benefits which have traditionally 
been allowed as set-off will point out the truth to appel· 
lant' s contention that most benefits do arise from the 
intended use. In Section 8.6203 (3) of 3 Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, the following benefits are listed: 
(a) " 
(b) " 
( c) " 
( d) " 
ple ... " 
. newly acquired frontage " 
. improved access . . . " 
. better accommodation of traffic .. · 
passing of a greater number of peu· 
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.From a careful consideration of the listed benefits 
it can be seen that a mere construction of an improve-
!llent will not give rise to the benefit. The benefit de-
pends upon the proposed and anticipated use of the 
improvement. 
The rule adopted by this Court creates a double 
standard-much to the advantage of the State Road 
Conunission. The Court's rule allows benefits arising 
from use but eliminates all damages arising from use. 
Such a double standard is obviously not sanctioned by 
the effect of each upon the market value of the remain-
ing land. 
" . . . The market value will reflect the pos-
sibility of harmful use as well as a beneficial 
one, and will discount the possibility that the 
public use may be discontinued altogether ... " 
(Emphasis added) . 
3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 8.6201, 
page 64. 
Likewise, this Court held that damages arising from 
use of the proposed improvement be actionable at com-
mon law or affect the land physically. Again, this same 
requirement of direct physical affect is not reflected in 
the benefits allowed. A review of the listed traditional 
benefits will point this out. Nichols in his work on Emi-
nent Domain emphasizes that benefits need not have a 
direct physical effect upon the remaining tract. 
eJf-
"The market value ..38- a parcel of land may 
be increased by a public improvement which ef-
fects no physical change in the land itself ... " 
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Further analysis of the above quoted statement 
from this Court's opinion, taken in view of the Oregon 
Short Line Rail Road case, clearly shows that that case 
actually considered elements of damage seemingly ex-
cluded by this opinion when it considered damages from 
"jarring", or by the "throwing of cinders or ashes". 
In short, such damages must of necessity arise from 
the "use" to which the property would ultimately be put. 
* * * * 
}~urther analysis of the opinion reveals another 
fatal defect when taken in light of the quote from Board 
of Education v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 
(1962). The portion of the quote which has significance 
is the following: 
"Damages to land, by the construction of a 
public or industrial improvement, through no 
part thereof is taken as provided for under 78· 
34-10 ( 3), contrary to the rule for severance 
da '' mages ... 
The statement referring to a different rule in "sev· 
erance" damage situations seems to be the obstacle in 
this entire matter which required the arbitrary defini-
tion of when and at what point damages become "con· 
sequential", as set forth in the opinion. Further, it can 
hardly be imagined that Justice 'Vade, when he wrote 
the Croft opinion, ever had in mind the precise distinc· 
tion between "severance" and "consequential" damages 
that is set forth in this decision. In fact, specific reference 
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is made to no-takin.q situations " ... as provided for 
under 78-34-10 (3), contrary to the rule for severance 
damages." The foregoing quote, taken from other 
authority, quite clearly separates the two types of dam-
ages as this writer is suggesting, and the opinion of this 
Court now sets up an arbitrary line distinguishing be-
tween "severance" and "consequential" damages, with-
out basic supporting authority or reason. 
The irony of the result in this case is that these 
defendants throughout their Brief contended that the 
case of Board of Education v. Croft was the prime 
authority supporting their own position, and the plain-
t tiff in its Brief at page 11 merely ref erred to the quota-
tion from the Croft case in this opinion as being "dicta" 
and " ... not sufficient to overrule the precedent and 
reasoning that has evolved since the enactment of the 
Utah State Constitution." It thus appears that both 
plaintiff and defendant felt that the quoted portion 
of the Croft case, contrary to the result reached by the 
Court in its opinion, was dispositive of the case in favor 
of defendants! 
POINT II 
EXCESSIVE NOISE IS A PROPER ELE-
MENT OF DAMAGE TO BE CONSIDERED 
IN A "TAKING" CASE UNDER SUBSECTION 
12) OF SECTION 78-34-10. 
15 
' 
I 
I 
Although the issue of the possible recovery ol I 
damages resulting from noise per se was not contested 
by either party to this litigation this Court's opinion 
is unusual in that it really decided the case on the basis 
that noise was a non-compensable element in assessing 
''severance" damages-as appellants would have it -
or, for that matter, even in "consequential" damage 
situations. Thus, in no case in Utah can noise as such 
be considered in an eminent domain proceeding. A 
simple ruling, as indicated above, would have eliminated 
the necessity of classifying noise as a "consequential" 
damage in a taking case; however, the rule enunciated 
in the Croft case forced the arbitrary line adopted by 
this Court since it referred to a different rule in "sever· 
ance" situations. 
The irony of the decision is multiplied when it is 
considered that, here again, neither the plaintiff nor 
the defendant ever raised so much as a suggestion that 
noise was not compensable in at least some situations. 
An analysis of plaintiff's Brief and the argument made 
before this Court will fail to find the slightest sugges· 
tion that noise is never compensable. The only position 
taken by plaintiff was that, in a '''severance" case involv· 
ing an underlying taking, as well as in a "consequential" 
case, the noise must be special, unique and peculiar to 
the property affected in order to be considered. Nothing 
in plaintiff's position implies or suggests that noise is 
never a proper element supporting, among others, n 
recovery in eminent domain cases. 
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But the matter is not as simple as that of excluding 
noise in all condemnation cases, as this Court has ruled. 
Referring to the Oregon Short Line Rail Road case 
cited by this Court in its opinion, we find that the refer-
ence to noise in that case was tied to-
"Mere noises, ... the effect (of which) would 
be to or upon the sensibilities of such persons, 
and not to or upon the property as such." 
Even if we accept the Court's cited reference as 
authority in Utah, the findings in this matter are not 
such as to classify the noise to the Williams' properties 
as being ''mere noises", which do not affect the value of 
the property. The specific finding of the Court was that 
the noises were so bad as to cause a diminution of 
$3,896.00 in the market value of the property. As such, 
the case cited by the Court in its opinion is not only a 
case which would only be applicable in "consequential" 
--0r non-taking cases (as was the fact )-but it is other-
wise factually not in point with the Williams' situation. 
Further, it is submitted that all individuals in the 
use of their properties are entitled to reasonably quiet 
and peaceable possessions of their premises. When the 
noise factor becomes so great that it is impossible to 
1 
sleep during the summer months because of heavy and 
noisy traffic, how can it be said that such noise is simply 
"disagreeable" or an "annoyance" merely affecting the 
"sensibilities of such persons". Certainly, noise to this 
degree has a very definite adverse effect on the prop-
erty, and, as a technical matter, is even a "physical" 
17 
trespass to the property itself in the form of loud anu 
continuous sound waves. 
A good number of airplane over-flight cases have I 
been handed down in federal and state courts in recent I 
years where noise has been the ingredient of damage. In 
some of the cases the noise has actually been considered 
to constitute an actual "taking" where the applicable 
state constitutional provision (or the Fifth Amendment 
to the U. S. Constitution) failed to include an "or 
damaged" provision similar to that contained in our 
Utah Constitution. The holdings in those non-taking 
cases have been predicated on the basis that the noise I 
was such an invasion as to " ... deprive ( d) the property 
owners of the enjoyment and use of their properties,'' J 
and the noise may come straight down from above, or I 
from some other direction. Even in those cases requiring I 
a trespass due to an over-flight of the land damaged 
(thereby effecting a technical legal taking) as in Batten 
v. U.S., 306 F. 2d 580 (10th C.C.A.), the noise element 
can be considered where an actual technical taking 
occurs, although no constitutional "or damaging" provi-
sion is present. 
To state that noise is never an element to be con· 
sidered in either a "severance" or a "consequential" dam· 
age case, as the Court's opinion makes quite clear, is to 
disregard the facts of life and practically every legal 
opinion on the subject in this nation. One need only go 
to the matter of noise created by low flying planes -
avigation problems - to find massive authority that 
18 
noise alone can be sufficient to permit recovery, par-
1 ticularly in cases involving takings. Similarly, the cases 
• simply abound from all of the states providing that noise 
! and similar proximity elements can be considered in the 
· overall assessment of damages in taking situations. A 
I
i few of many decisions are cited in. Appellants' Brief: 
Tou.chberry-South Carolina (p. 12), Bourg and Leger 
-Louisiana (p. 21), Elizabeth Amusements, Inc. -
Kentucky p. 21), Zaremba-Kentucky (p. 22), Burns 
' -Kentucky (p. 22), Methodist Church-Georgia (p. 
23), Pierpont Inn, Inc.-California (p. 23), and our 
own Utah case of State Road Cornmission v. Christensen 
I (p. 22), 13 u. 2d 224, 371 p 2d 522 ( 1962) . 
J There is another serious problem which is over-
' I looked in the opinion-and that is the matter of segre-
1 
gating noise from other elements of damage. The 
Williams' case contained a somewhat unusual situation 
1
1 in that the amount of damage assignable to noise was 
determinable because the appraiser of the property 
I 
owner used a "cost of cure" approach. Had this ap-
proach not been used, as will be the situation in prob-
/
. ~bly 90% of all cases where noise is an element mixed 
Ill with other elements of damage, how could noise 
ever properly be separated from an appraisal? The 
I problems are great in this respect, and a condemnation 
i matter involving such elements of damage might of ten 
• binge on what appraiser and lawyer was best prepared 
, as a technical matter. Just compensation should not 
he made to hinge on such technicalities. 
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I 
On the general subject of attempting to segregate ' pr 
and place value~ ~pon diff er~nt factors contribut~ng tu i ar 
damage to remammg properties, the Appellate Division el' 
of the Supreme Court of New York ( 1967) in the case th 
of Dennison v. State, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 257, pointed out 01 
that a consideration of noise as a factor contributing I 
to damages was not separable from other concededly 
0 
legitimate factors, and therefore, was not subject to [ ol 
a valuation by the Appellate Court. It also pointed out I r! 
that the inter-relation of noise with elements such as :
1
. 
0 
vision and privacy would have made it impossible to 
attribute specific amount to noise. However, the issue 
was resolved since the court held noise was properly \ rr 
considered a factor of damage caused by the construe- I 
tion of a new highway. . ti 
CONCLUSION 
With all due respect to the opinion handed down I s 
by this Court it can be said that the opinion seemingly / t 
reads well, but a close analysis of the opinion reveals 
serious defects of factual application and legal inter· I 
pretation which can be summarized as follows: I 
I. The Court created an erroneous distinction 
between "severance" and "consequential" damages, anrl 
the quoted portion from the Croft case supports the rule i 
and theory advanced by appellants in this case rather 11 
than that of the opposite position. 
2. The apparent ruling of this Court to the effect 
that damages resulting from the intended "use" of :i , 
20 
, . project cannot be considered in the severance damage 
J i analysis is both unsound law and is contrary to the 
1 elements of damage which were actually considered in 
e the Oregon Short Line Railroad case cited in the 
t opinion. 
~ I 3. As a factual matter the type of noise in the Oregon Short Line Rail Road case was not the degree 
() ! 
I of noise sustained by the 'Villiams' properties as was 
11 I reflected in a substantial diminution in the market value 
I 
,; I 
:· ! 
-· 1 
of the properties. 
4. Noise has uniformly been recognized as an ele-
ment affecting value of remaining properties in "sever-
ance or taking cases where it was of sufficient degree 
to affect market value. 
* * * * 
The opinion handed down in this matter should be 
n / substantially modified and the judgment resulting 
ly I therefrom should be reversed in favor of appellants. 
ls 
r-1 Respectfully submitted, 
)[] 
)0 
I 
It i 
I er :, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Appellants 
15 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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